This was my a draft set of speaker notes. I have since drafted the slides as “adam\_slides.pdf”. Read “chat\_gpt\_instructions.docx” and “instructions\_for\_analysing\_presentations.docx”.

Then propose my speaker notes for each of my slides.

Take into account that Opposing viewpoints to your primary sources

My sources lean toward critical/institutional perspectives (organisational inertia, disinformation as hybrid warfare). Opposing viewpoints include:

• Wilson (bureaucracy, inertia) – Opposed by “rational choice” theorists who argue bureaucracies adapt efficiently when incentives align, and by technocratic optimists who stress reform potential through managerialism rather than cultural inertia.

• Nagl/Fitzgerald (doctrinal amnesia) – Opposed by critics who say COIN and “organisational learning” are overstated myths; some argue U.S. Army pragmatism shows selective adaptation rather than amnesia ––(Conclusion).pdf. Others (e.g., Nixon-era critiques ) blamed lack of imagination, not learning failure.

• Ahmed/Bachmann/Lemmon (disinformation = existential threat) – Opposed by scholars like Bennett & Livingston (“disinformation panic”), who argue its scale and effect are overstated, with institutional failures (corruption, governance) more damaging than fake news per se.

• Gill (NATO StratCom) – Opposed by those warning StratCom risks militarising information space, eroding democratic freedoms, or being indistinguishable from propaganda.

• Kragh & Åsberg (Russian active measures) – Opposed by analysts who argue Russian disinformation’s effectiveness is often exaggerated, with local vulnerabilities (polarisation, trust deficits) more decisive than Kremlin operations.

**Initial draft: Segment 2 – Ethical Tensions & the Digital Environment (5 mins)**

The Defence Forces operate in an environment where information moves faster than orders. There exists a murky conflation of ambiguity, deniability and scarcity of attribution (BACHMANN\_2020). Strategic communication is essential to legitimacy, but it sits on an ethical tightrope.

**Transparency vs Secrecy.**  
Bachmann argues that disinformation is now as destructive as kinetic warfare — perception and operations are inseparable (Bachmann, 2023). Leaders face a dilemma: disclose and risk operational compromise, or remain silent and risk fuelling suspicion. Gunneriusson’s work on Russian “deniability” shows how reticence corrodes credibility (Gunneriusson, 2019). Yet Bachmann and Paphiti caution that too much openness can itself be weaponised by adversaries (Bachmann & Paphiti, 2021).

**Persuasion vs Propaganda.**  
Taylor reminds us that democracies have always used persuasion. The danger is “propaganda creep,” where reassurance tips into manipulation. Lemmon shows how, once people sense spin, every future message is tainted (Lemmon, 2024). Bradshaw and Howard add that even democratic governments have used computational propaganda, undermining their own legitimacy (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019). A related pitfall is *corporate-speak*: the bland, formulaic statements that avoid hard truths. Such language raises suspicion precisely because it sounds rehearsed.

**The Social Media Environment.**  
Zannettou’s research shows how hoaxes and memes spread faster than corrections (Zannettou et al., 2018). Pennycook and Rand find that inattentive sharing, not malice, drives much misinformation (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). This is compounded by states’ increasingly potent intentional disinformation campaigns – such as by Russia and the CCP (Bachmann, 2020). The battlefield, then, is not only factual but attentional — how quickly and clearly leaders respond matters as much as the facts themselves.

**Consider this – Clancy’s Dilemma.**  
Imagine you are the Chief of Staff. Reports of abuse within your organisation dominate the headlines. Do you admit publicly that members feel “ashamed” and “betrayed” (Clancy, *Irish Times*, 2023)? Or do you protect the institution’s image, risking accusations of cover-up? Clancy chose candour. Some saw integrity; others saw reputational damage. But crucially, he avoided corporate-speak. Had he hidden behind vague phrases about “ongoing processes” or “governance frameworks,” suspicion would only have deepened. The lesson is clear: when credibility is at stake, delay and polish do more harm than blunt truth.

**Bottom Line (Segment 2).**  
Ethical communication demands judgement in the grey zone. Too much secrecy fuels distrust, too much openness risks compromise. But nothing erodes credibility faster than slow, evasive, or corporate-style responses. Speed, facts, and candour are the only sustainable defence.

**Segment 4 – Building Resilience & Leadership Strategies (5 mins)**

If Segment 2 laid out the dilemmas, Segment 4 asks: how do the Defence Forces build resilience? The answer lies in literacy, frameworks, leadership, and partnerships — but all must be grounded in credibility.

**Institutional Resilience.**  
Dimov argues that digital literacy is the first line of defence (Dimov, 2024). The U.S. Army War College advocates inoculation: training people to recognise manipulation before a crisis (USAWC, 2024). For the Defence Forces, resilience is less about firefighting and more about embedding awareness and judgement across the organisation. Education on the very-real use if disinformation is important – such as the CCP’s “Three Warfares” doctrine (Bachmann 2020). When presented with a social media post for-example, simply asking yourself “what’s the purpose of this” may reveal disinformation.

**Frameworks & Tools.**  
NATO’s StratCom COE Toolkit and the EU’s East StratCom Task Force provide models — scenario-based training, fact-checking networks, rapid response teams. For Ireland, the challenge is scale: adapting these frameworks realistically to small-state resources.

**Leadership Role in Resilience.**  
Wilson’s work on bureaucratic inertia, Nagl’s on organisational learning, and Fitzgerald’s on “doctrinal amnesia” all warn that institutions tend to forget lessons after crises. Clancy’s blunt message that “the Defence Forces must change” (Clancy, *Irish Times*, 2023) reflects the opposite of corporate-speak: leadership willing to admit failure. Leaders build resilience by setting that tone — quick, factual, and transparent, even when truths are uncomfortable.

**Whole-of-Society Partnerships.**  
Resilience is not solely a Defence Forces responsibility. NATO and EU examples, such as Latvia’s military–media cooperation, show the value of coordinated rebuttals. But caution is needed: if communication looks too centralised, publics suspect censorship. The key is cooperation without co-option — supporting media independence while ensuring rapid factual response.

**Critical Perspective.**  
Resilience measures can backfire if they are overly centralised, bureaucratic, or jargon-laden. If publics perceive resilience as spin, credibility collapses. The antidote is not more process, but more truth, delivered quickly and plainly.

**Bottom Line (Segment 4).**  
Public trust is strategic capital. Resilience is not achieved through slogans or polished messaging. It comes from leaders who speak plainly, institutions that learn rather than forget, and partnerships that enhance credibility without stifling independence. Quick, factual candour is the only currency that buys long-term resilience.